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Abstract 
This paper is based on the analysis of the financial projections for three of the Scottish Futures 
Trust hub schemes. The paper develops a range of financial indicators, designed in particular to 
throw light on the following questions. Namely, what is the opportunity cost to the public sector 
of the hub approach: and what are the potential profits to private sector investors in the risk 
capital of hub projects. The paper concludes that the existing availability of information to the 
public and Scottish Parliament on hub schemes is inadequate, and that a standard set of 
indicators should be specified, and produced as a required by-product of the financial models 
for all hub projects. More broadly, the evidence suggests that there should now be a wider 
consideration as to whether the advantages of the hub approach justify the costs to the public 
sector, and the potentially large profits for private sector investors. 
 
I Introduction 
 
When it came to power in 2007, the SNP led Scottish Government introduced a new type of 
public private partnership, (PPP), known as the non-profit distributing, (NPD), model. This was 
designed to remedy some of the acknowledged defects in the old Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
system, principally by reducing the scope for the equity owners to remove large profits as 
dividends. When the Scottish Futures Trust, (SFT), was set up in 2008, it took over and developed 
the NPD programme. In addition, in 2010 the SFT introduced the hub approach, a further type of 
PPP arrangement, to facilitate smaller public infrastructure projects by collaborative working, 
and, where appropriate, by bundling projects together. 
 
Under the hub initiative, Scotland is divided into five hubco areas, where each hubco is a 
partnership between the SFT, public bodies like local authorities and health boards, and private 
sector partners. The hubcos are responsible for developing projects for the provision of new 
public infrastructure in their areas, like schools, health centres etc. Each project which goes 
ahead is a self-standing PPP funded by a mixture of senior debt and subordinate debt, and with 
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limited equity input. To date, there has been over £2 billion of capital investment either 
undertaken or in the pipeline via the hub programme. 
 
Both the SFT and the Scottish Government publish periodic reports on the hub programme. 
These contain, for example, the key dates for each scheme, the capital value, the annual unitary 
charge to be paid by the public sector client, and the names of the lenders of senior and sub 
debt. What is not available from these reports, however, is crucial information on the financial 
characteristics of hub schemes. It is not possible, for example, to answer the following types of 
question ó either for individual hub schemes, or for aggregates of hub schemes: 
a) what is the opportunity cost to the public sector of the hub approach: that is, if the public 
sector had been borrowing at the same interest rates at which it could have borrowed from the 
National Loans Fund, how much capital investment could have been undertaken for the cost of 
the unitary charge payments which the public sector has contracted to make? (leaving aside that 
element of the unitary charge which will pay for ongoing services.) 
 
b) what are the potential profits to private sector investors in hub sub debt if, for example, they 
were to decide to sell their holdings in the secondary market? 
 
Yet, without answers to questions like these, it is impossible for the public, or the Scottish 
Parliament, to form a judgement as to whether the hub approach is likely to be delivering value 
for money for the public sector: or whether private sector participants may be in a position to 
extract excess profits, as was the case with the old PFI initiative which was superceded in 
Scotland by the current hub and NPD approaches. (See, for example, a recent paper by Whitfield, 
(2017), which records that the average annual rate of return to equity holders in PFI projects who 
sold their equity stakes in the secondary market was 28%, based on 110 transactions in 277 
projects.) 
 
This paper uses financial projections for three hub schemes, obtained under Freedom of 
Information, to derive indicators which are relevant to answering the above types of question. A 
number of clear conclusions emerge from this process and they fall under three main headings: 
monitoring; the need to re-assess the rationale of the hub programme; and, the need for greater 
VXSSRUWRIWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQWöV3XEOLF$XGLW&RPPLWWHHLQVFUXWLQLVLQJ6)7DFWLYLWLHV 
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More specifically I conclude that: 
 
On monitoring 
 
i) a standard set of indicators should be specified, (potentially based on those indicators 
analysed in this paper), which should be produced as a required by-product of the financial 
models for all hub projects. 
ii) the indicators for each scheme should be reported to SFT. In addition to assessing these 
indicators for their own purposes of monitoring the operation of the hub programme, SFT should 
publish, as soon as possible after the end of each year, annual average values for these 
indicators. 
iii) Two years after each scheme becomes operational, SFT should publish the values of the 
LQGLFDWRUV IRU WKDW VFKHPH 7KLV ZRXOG EH FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK 6)7öV SROLF\ WKDW WKH ILQDQFLDO
projections for individual schemes should cease to be confidential after this lapse of time. 
 
Re-assessing the rationale of the hub programme 
 
There should be active consideration, by the Scottish Government and public authorities, as to 
whether the advantages of the hub approach justify the costs to the public sector, and the 
potentially large profits for private sector investors. Even if it is too early yet, given the limited 
information currently available, to make a final decision, these questions should be kept under 
active review, in the light of whatever trends might emerge from the improved monitoring 
system. 
 
Role of 6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQWöVPublic Audit Committee 
 
7KH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQWöV3XEOLF$XGLW&RPPLWWHHFOHDUO\VWUXJJOHVZLWKLWVUROHRIVFUXWLQLVLQJ
6)7öVDFWLYLWLHV7KH&RPPLWWHHZRXOG find it much easier to discharge its role if it insisted that 
the SFT reported to it regularly on the basis of a specific, and detailed, set of indicators. It is 
recommended that the Audit Committee should adopt this approach: and that, as regards 
financial indicators for the hub programme, the Committee should take as its starting point the 
list of indicators considered in this paper. 
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II Indicators of the financial performance of hub projects 
 
For hub projects, as for other public private partnership schemes, the key financial document is 
the set of financial projections produced at the time that the contract for the scheme is signed. 
These projections are produced by the Special Purpose Vehicle, (SPV), undertaking the project, 
and are shared with the public sector clients. The projections give a detailed breakdown, 
(typically six monthly or yearly), of all the sources of finance for the project: that is, by means of 
senior and subordinate debt input, equity input, capital contributions, (if any), and, during the 
operations phase of the project, unitary charge payments from the public sector client. The 
projections also give all financial outflows: that is, construction and development costs, the cost 
of providing services during the operations phase, SPV running costs, lifecycle costs, repayment 
of borrowed capital and interest, dividend payments, and tax. In other words, the projections 
give a complete, and very detailed, picture of income and expenditure of the project through its 
life, on the assumption that all goes according to plan with the project.  
 
6)7öV SROLF\ LV WKDW WKH ILQDQFLDO SURMHFWLRQV VKRXOG EH UHJDUGHG DV EHLQJ FRPPHUFLDO LQ
confidence for an initial period, to protect the interests of the participants and funders: but that 
the projections should become publicly available two years after the project becomes 
operational: that is, approximately two years after the completion of construction. SFT have also 
VWDWHGWKHLULQWHQWWRSXEOLVKDOOKXEILQDQFLDOPRGHOVRQ6)7öVZHEVLWHRQFHWKHUHOHYDQWSHULRG
of confidentiality is over: (refer SFT: contract website). This is a relatively liberal policy on 
confidentiality, and is to be welcomed. It contrasts favourably, for example, with the difficulty of 
obtaining financial projections for many schemes under the former PFI initiative. 
 
However, SFT do not appear to be accessing or assimilating such information for their own 
SXUSRVHVRUIRUWKHSXUSRVHRILQIRUPLQJWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQWöV3XEOLF$XGLW&RPPLWWHHFor 
example, when he appeared before the committee on 7 December 2017, the then Deputy Chief 
Executive of SFT gave the following very limited information to the committee on the cost of 
finance for hub, and non-profit distributing, (NPD), schemes: 
øThe average senior debt rate is 4.09 per cent and the average for junior debt is 10.8 per cent 
ZKLFKOHDGVWRDQDOOLQZHLJKWHGFRVWRIFDSLWDORISHUFHQWù 
 
 5    Fraser of Allander Institute 
For the purposes of the present paper, an exercise was conducted by the author, using Freedom 
of Information, to obtain the financial projections for six hub schemes which KDGSDVVHG6)7öV
confidentiality time limit. (Freedom of Information was used to avoid delays in information on 
ILQDQFLDOSURMHFWLRQVDSSHDULQJRQ6)7öV contract website.) Three of the projections obtained 
proved to be fairly readily analysable. What this section does is to develop a set of financial 
indicators, illustrated with reference to these three projections, and designed to elucidate 
important aspects of the financial performance of hub schemes. Along the way, the process of 
developing these indicators will illustrate how the information given by SFT to the committee is 
too limited, and also potentially misleading.  
  
The financial models analysed here are for the following schemes. Namely, Alford Academy, an 
£18.4 million project for Aberdeenshire Council in the North Hub area, with an operational date 
RI2FWREHU-DPHV*LOOHVSLHöV+LJK6FKRROD £33.9 million capital value project for the City 
of Edinburgh, in the South East Hub area, operational in August 2016: and the North Lanarkshire 
Health Centres Bundle project, for NHS Lanarkshire, a £38.9 million capital value project in the 
South West Hub area, operational in May 2015. Note that the three projections chosen for 
analysis here are for illustrative purposes only, rather than being a representative sample of hub 
financial models. In particular, since all of these projects fall, necessarily, fairly early in the hub 
programme, their senior debt interest rates are probably fairly high, since the base government 
gilt edged interest rates have fallen since the early days of the hub programme. The levels of 
senior debt interest rate observed for these projects should not, therefore be taken as indicative 
of all hub projects. 
 
It should be noted also that in calculating the indicators in this paper there are some elements 
of judgement, for example about attribution of certain borderline expenditures to the 
construction or operations phase. This is unlikely to have any significant impact on the 
indicators as calculated: but may mean that the values derived here would not agree exactly 
with those that might be derived by another agent repeating the calculations. 
 
The specific topics, and indicators, dealt with in this section are as follows:- 
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The need to state the cost of finance separately for NPD and hub schemes 
 
In his evidence to the Public Audit Committee, quoted above, the Deputy Chief Executive of SFT 
was quoting a cost of debt averaged over two major SFT initiatives ó namely, the NPD and hub 
programmes. NPD projects tend to be large, (an example is the £469 million value Aberdeen 
Bypass), and, as such, have been able to attract a portion of their senior debt funding from the 
European Investment Bank, (EIB). EIB funding is cheap: for example, one loan by the EIB to a UK 
water utility was at a real interest rate of 1.2%. As a result, the average cost of senior debt, 
averaged over NPD and hub projects, may well understate the actual cost of senior debt for hub 
projects. However, it is not possible to quantify any such bias, given the lack of published 
information. The important conclusion is that figures on the cost of finance should always be 
quoted separately for hub and NPD projects, rather than combined. 
 
The effect of fees on senior debt interest rates 
 
In a typical PPP project, the interest rate for senior debt will be based on the UK government gilt 
interest rate at the time the contract for the project is signed, to which is added an additional 
IXQGHUöV PDUJLQ 7KH UHVXOWLQJ LQWHUHVW UDWH RI JLOW UDWH SOXV PDUJLQ LV RQH FRPPRQO\ XVHG
measure for denoting the cost of senior debt: and, (as has emerged from correspondence with 
SFT), is the rate normally quoted by SFT. The following table shows this rate for the three projects 
considered here. 
 
Table 1 Senior debt interest: gilt rate plus margin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, quoting this rate does not give a full picture of what the borrower is actually paying. In 
DGGLWLRQWKHERUURZHUZLOOW\SLFDOO\EHFKDUJHGDIHHFRYHULQJDVSHFWVOLNHøDUUDQJHPHQWùDQG
øFRPPLWPHQWùDQGDPRXQWLQJYHU\FRPPRQO\WR2% to 3% of the original capital sum being 
 percent 
Alford Academy 5.01 
-DPHV*LOOHVSLHöV 5.40 
North Lanarkshire Health Centres 5.36 
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borrowed. The following table shows senior debt fees for the three projects considered here, 
expressed as a percentage of the amount of senior debt borrowed. 
 
Table 2 Senior debt fees, as a percentage relative to senior debt borrowing  
 
 
In PPP projects this fee is normally capitalised: that is, it is added to the sum borrowed, and paid 
off through a stream of capital repayments and interest charges during the life of the project. So 
if a borrower borrows £100 to spend on construction costs, what they will actually pay is the 
ORDQFKDUJHVRQVD\e)URPWKHERUURZHUöVSRLQWRIYLHZWKHUHIRUHWKHLQWHUHVWUDWHWKH\
are actually paying is better represented by the internal rate of return, (IRR), of a transaction 
which corresponds to an initial drawdown of £100, followed by the stream of repayments 
relating to the capital sum comprising original loan plus fees. The effect of excluding fees is to 
materially understate the actual interest rate being paid for senior debt by the borrower. For 
example, if fees have been charged at 3% of the capital raised, and if this fee has been 
capitalised, then this is likely to increase the actual IRR being paid by about 0.3 percentage 
points.  
 
SFT have pointed out in correspondence that other factors come in to the assessment of the 
senior debt funding package, as well as interest rates. Such factors, for example, include debt 
service and loan life cover ratios, and requirements for reserves. For this reason, SFT do not use 
a version of the senior debt IRR which includes fees. This appears a weak argument. While it is 
true that the other factors specified by SFT are important, a balanced picture of funding costs 
should surely also take account of the impact of capitalised fees on the interest rate actually 
being paid. 
 
It is also a good question, (to which SFT have not as yet provided an answer), as to why fees for 
senior debt of up to 3% appear to be commonly charged on hub projects. On the face of it, the 
 percent 
Alford Academy 2.33 
-DPHV*LOOHVSLHöV 3.08 
North Lanarkshire Health Centres 2.69 
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size of this margin is surprising, given that the provision of senior debt for hub projects is not 
approached on a one-off basis for each project, but is done through what is effectively an annual 
framework competition for all projects in each hub area. Indeed, one might have thought that 
this process would have been expected to result in low arrangement fees. 
 
Use of WACC versus IRR 
 
The indicator SFT quoted to the committee as a measure of the combined cost of senior and 
subordinate debt was the weighted average cost of capital, (WACC). This is calculated as the 
average of the senior and sub debt rates, weighted together by the relative amounts of capital 
raised through the senior and sub debt routes. Since senior debt in hub projects typically 
accounts for 90% of the total capital raised, the WACC, based on the figures quoted by SFT, is 
4.09*0.09 + 10.8*0.1 = 4.76: give or take rounding, this is the figure quoted by SFT. 
 
The WACC is indeed a standard shorthand measure of the combined cost of capital. 
Unfortunately, it has a major drawback, in that it will only equal the actual interest rate payed 
by the borrower, (that is, the IRR of the overall transaction), if the repayment profiles of senior 
and subordinate debt are the same. Typically, however, subordinate debt will be repaid on a 
later time profile compared to senior debt: this is normally a condition stipulated by the senior 
debt lenders, who will insist that their loans are substantially repaid before the sub debt loans 
are repaid. Since sub debt has less security than senior debt, and is therefore riskier, sub debt 
interest rates will be significantly higher than senior debt interest rates. These two factors, 
namely, the later repayment profile of sub debt, and its higher interest rate, mean that the WACC 
for senior and sub debt will understate the actual combined interest rate being paid on senior 
and sub debt. 
 
The following table shows, for the three projects analysed here, the WACC of senior and sub 
debt, and the combined IRR of senior and sub debt. (In both cases, the cost of fees has been 
included for senior debt.) 
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Table 3 WACC and combined IRR for senior plus sub debt (percent)  
 
 
In each case the WACC, as expected, understates the true combined cost of senior plus sub debt. 
The bias in these three examples is not large, (a maximum of 0.18 percentage points in the case 
of Alford), but it is still material. 
 
Since the combined IRR is the more accurate measure, the conclusion to be drawn is that the 
IRR, rather than the WACC, should be quoted as the primary measure of the combined cost of 
senior and sub debt. However, there are also advantages in quoting the WACC alongside the 
combined IRR. The reason for this is as follows. If, through time, it was observed that the 
difference between IRR and WACC was tending to increase, this could indicate that, for the later 
projects, sub debt lenders are having their loans repaid on increasingly delayed timescales. 
Now, for a given sub debt IRR, the later the loan is repaid, the greater the potential value to the 
lender if they were to sell their sub debt holdings in the secondary market: (this point is 
explained in more detail in the section below on net present values.) So an observed increasing 
differential between IRR and WACC could indicate that the potential for increasing, and perhaps 
excessive, profits on sub debt was being built into later schemes. 
 
Project IRR as against combined IRR of senior and sub debt 
 
As seen in the previous section, the appropriate measure of the combined cost of senior and 
sub debt is the combined senior and sub debt IRR, rather than the WACC. But the cost of funding 
is only one component of the overall transaction in which the public sector is engaged. From the 
overall perspective of the public sector client, what they are getting is a capital asset, plus a 
stream of services through the 30 year life of the project: and what they are paying is a stream 
of unitary charge payments throuJKWKHSURMHFWöVRSHUDWLRQDOOLIH,IZHQHWRIIIURPWKHVWUHDP
of unitary charge payments what is being spent on services each year, what is left is the 
 WACC Combined IRR 
Alford Academy 5.65 5.83 
James GillespieöV 6.46 6.60 
North Lanarkshire Health Centres 6.39 6.55 
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component of the unitary charge which is not about the provision of services: here this is called 
the non-service element, (NSE). So another way of looking at the project is that it involves a 
transaction where the public sector is getting a capital asset costing a specified amount: and is 
paying for that asset via the stream of NSE payments during the life of the project. It is simple to 
calculate the IRR of this transaction: it is commonly called the project IRR. The project IRR is 
probably the best measure of the effective interest rate the public sector is actually paying. 
 
Using the detail in the financial projections, project IRRs were calculated for all three of the 
projects being analysed in this paper. In more detail, in each case the capital cost was taken as 
the cost of construction of the project, plus development costs: (in those cases where the 
authority made a capital contribution to funding the capital cost of the scheme, the amount of 
any such contribution was subtracted off the capital cost.) The NSE was calculated in each 
period as the unitary charge, less the following terms: projected payments for SPV admin; 
facilities management; and lifecycle costs, (that is, projected replacement of items and 
equipment during the project life). That leaves the question of tax. One of the financial outflows 
is the projected stream of corporate tax paymeQWVGXULQJ WKHSURMHFWöV OLIH6KRXOG WKHVH WD[
SD\PHQWVEHLQFOXGHGDVSDUWRIWKHSURMHFWöV16(RUQRW"7KLVFDQEHDUJXHGERWKZD\VDVZLOO
be seen below. So in fact, for the purpose of this study, two alternative NSE streams were 
calculated, one including tax, the other not.  
 
The project IRRs resulting from this process are shown in the following table ó which also 
repeats, for comparison, the combined IRR of senior and sub debt. 
 
Table 4 Project IRRs, together with the combined IRR of senior and sub debt (percent) 
      
 Combined IRR Project IRR, 
Excluding tax 
Project IRR, 
Including tax 
Alford Academy 5.83 6.00 6.67 
James GillespieöV 6.60 6.80 7.28 
North Lanarkshire Health Centres 6.55 6.97 7.86 
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There are a number of interesting things to notice about this table. First of all, excluding tax, the 
project IRR is materially higher in each case than the combined IRR of senior and sub debt. At 
first sight, this looks surprising, because, once services and tax are taken out of consideration, 
virtually all the remaining expenditure by the project will be on financing costs. The answer is 
largely to do with phasing. The project will initially be building up balances, and then running 
them down. Hence the payment profile of debt service will be phased later than the profile of 
NSE payments, lowering the IRR of the former relative to the latter. It is, however, the project IRR 
which corresponds to what the public sector is actually paying: and hence is the more 
informative indicator. 
 
The second interesting question is which project IRR should be used, excluding or including tax? 
From the point of view of the overall public sector, corporate tax just goes out of one pocket and 
back into another: so there is an DUJXPHQWWKDWWKHøFRUUHFWùSURMHFW,55LVWKDWH[FOXGLQJWD[
There are, however, two counter-arguments:- 
a) from a Scottish perspective, tax paid to Westminster is lost to the Scottish budget, (apart from 
possible second order effects via the Barnett formula.) 
b) whether the SPVs will actually pay the corporate tax originally projected is unclear, 
particularly if ownership of the SPVs were to move offshore. 
 
There is thus a strong argument for saying that the project IRR, including tax, is the more 
informative measure of the actual effective interest cost to the public sector of obtaining capital 
assets using the hub model. In any event, the sensible conclusion to draw is that, in practice, 
both versions of the project IRR should be quoted. 
 
The need to consider net present values as well as interest rates 
 
Interest rates, like the (unreliable) WACC, and the IRR, are standard, but still only partial, 
indicators of the true costs of a transaction. To obtain a fuller understanding of the implications 
of a particular transaction, it is necessary to consider the net present value, (NPV), of the stream 
of payments involved in the transaction, discounted at an appropriate discount rate. (For a fuller 
discussion, see, for example, Cuthbert and Cuthbert, (2012)). 
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It is useful to give two examples to illustrate this point. Suppose a subordinate debt investor in 
a PPP scheme is projected to receive an IRR of 10.8% on their investment over the life of the 
project: (this would be a standard rate of return on hub projects). Suppose, however, that this 
investor decides, soon after the completion of the construction phase of the project, to sell their 
sub debt holding in the secondary market: and suppose they find a buyer in the shape of a 
pension fund, where this buyer has the target of achieving a 6% rate of return on their purchase. 
Knowing the figure of 10.8% tells us very little about what price the secondary market investor 
will be willing to pay. Instead, what we need to know is the net present value of the projected 
stream of sub debt returns, discounted at a discount rate of 6%. This is the price the pension 
fund will be willing to pay. And the really important point to remember is that the more the stream 
of sub debt payments is weighted towards the later years of WKHSURMHFWöVOLIHWKHQWKHJUHDWHU
the NPV of that stream will be, when discounted at a discount rate less than the original IRR. 
 
This is the trap that the Treasury fell into in the original version of PFI. They had set a target rate 
of return of about 15% as being a reasonable return for the equity investors in PFI projects: but 
did not realise that the equity investors were heavily end-loading their projected returns ó so 
that the NPVs at secondary market discount rates were multiples of the original investment. This 
led to the grotesque profits realised on some early PFI schemes.  
 
To give a second example of the importance of NPVs: suppose that a public authority has the 
option of conventional capital procurement, funded by a loan at National Loans Fund borrowing 
rates: or procurement via some form of PPP, like a hub project. What the authority will want to 
know is how much more it is paying, by going down the PPP route, than if it had borrowed from 
the NLF. The net present value of the projected stream of non-service element payments under 
the PPP route, discounted at the NLF borrowing rate, will indicate how much the public authority 
could have borrowed from the NLF, for the price of the same stream of payments. In comparison 
with the capital sum it would actually have to have borrowed under conventional procurement, 
this will indicate the opportunity cost to the public authority of having gone down the PPP route. 
Of course, other things also have to be borne in mind, (like risk transfer under the PPP route.) 
But nevertheless, the NPV comparison is fundamental to understanding what the cost of PPP 
procurement to the public sector actually is.  
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The following tables show the above two indicators, for the three hub models analysed in this 
note. 
 
The first table shows the NPV of the stream of sub debt payments, discounted at a discount rate 
of 6%. In each case, the NPV has been expressed as a percentage of the capital originally raised 
by sub debt, (excluding fees and interest rolled up during the construction period.) 
 
Table 5 The NPV of sub debt payments, discounted at 6%, as a percentage of the capital 
originally raised through sub debt 
 
 NPV as % capital raised 
Alford Academy 172.2 
James GillespieöV 180.8 
North Lanarkshire Health Centres 180.1 
 
 
What the figures indicate is that, if the sub debt investors were to sell their sub debt holdings 
soon after the project became operational, they might anticipate receiving back their original 
investment, plus a profit margin of around 80% of their original investment. This is clearly a very 
material level of potential profit. It is lower than the kind of profit realised by equity holders in 
many early PFI schemes ó but is still very significant. 
 
In fact, the level of potential profit in the above table is a good deal less than that envisaged by 
at least one potential investor in hub sub debt. A document produced by Aberdeen City Council, 
(2015), about the opportunities for investing in the sub debWRIRWKHUFRXQFLOVöKXEVFKHPHV
envisaged that an investment of £1 million might yield a return of £2.7 million if the stream of 
potential rewards was capitalised: (as would be achieved, for example, by a secondary market 
sale.)  
 
The next table shows the NPV of the non-service element of the three example schemes, 
discounted at a discount rate of 4%, (which is close to the NLF borrowing rate at the time in 
question for loans of this maturity.) The figures have been expressed as a percentage of the NPV 
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of construction and development costs: and have been calculated for both versions of the NSE, 
excluding and including tax. 
 
Table 6 NPV of NSE discounted at 4%, expressed as a percentage of construction and 
development costs (percent)        
 
 
As can be seen, the opportunity cost to the public sector of hub schemes is material. In line with 
the discussion in the previous section, the including tax figure is probably a better measure of 
opportunity cost from the point of view of a Scottish public body. Given this, it can be seen that, 
in two of the above examples, the public body could have borrowed 40% more from the NLF for 
the cost of going down the hub route. The question for consideration, of course, is whether the 
price of using the hub approach is a price worth paying: factors which would come into this 
assessment would exclude the extent of risk transfer to the private sector under the hub 
DSSURDFKWKHEHQHILWVRIJHWWLQJFDSLWDOH[SHQGLWXUHøRIIWKHERRNVùDVLVDFKLHYHGZLWKWKH
hub programme; and what is the actual worth to the public sector of any dividends eventually 
reaped by the Hub Charitable Foundation. 
 
III  Consideration and conclusions 
 
One of the things which the analysis in this paper has clearly established is how the kind of 
measure quoted by SFT to the Public Audit Committee gives only a partial, and potentially 
misleading, impression of the true costs involved in hub schemes. To illustrate this point, it is 
worthwhile comparing two extremal measures of the overall cost of hub financing. On the one 
hand is the WACC of senior and sub debt, excluding fees: (that is, the measure apparently 
quoted by SFT.) On the other hand is the overall project IRR, including tax. The difference 
between the two measures is very significant: in all of the three examples considered here it is 
more than one percentage point, and in one of the cases is almost two percentage points. It is 
not being suggested here that one of these measures is wrong, and the other right: they are both 
 Excluding tax Including tax 
Alford Academy 116.1 122.9 
James GillespieöV 131.1 138.6 
North Lanarkshire Health Centres 131.5 144.3 
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legitimate indicators for different purposes. (Although the author personally thinks that the 
project IRR is much the more informative measure.) The crucial point is that a full picture of what 
hub financing involves cannot be obtained on the basis of a single indicator, or a limited range 
of indicators.  
 
The first, and possibly most important, conclusion to be drawn is that, to give the full picture, a 
full palette of indicators has to be used to analyse hub financing. This set of indicators should 
include: 
 
 The effective interest rate on senior debt, both including and excluding fees, and the 
interest rate on sub debt. 
 The WACC of senior and sub debt, and the combined IRR of senior and sub debt. 
 Both measures of project IRR, excluding and including tax. 
 The net present value of sub debt payments, calculated at a discount rate reflecting 
conditions in the potential secondary market for subordinate debt: and the net present 
value of the non-service element of the unitary charge, calculated at a discount rate 
equal to the appropriate National Loans Fund interest rate. 
 
There are, in addition, further important implications for monitoring. One thing that became very 
apparent to the author in the course of this exercise is that it is labour intensive to produce such 
a set of indicators for any given project from the detailed financial projections for the project. 
This leads to the immediate conclusion, that a specific set of indicators should be defined, and 
that it should be a requirement for all hub projects that these standard indicators should be 
produced as part of the financial modelling for the project.  
 
That leaves the question of who should specify these indicators. This should presumably be SFT, 
possibly in conjunction with the Public Audit Committee or Audit Scotland. 
 
But indicators are only of value if they are considered and used. So it is recommended: 
 
 That for each hub project, the indicators should be reported to SFT when the contract for 
the project is being finalised ó so that SFT can use the indicators in their ongoing scrutiny 
of the operation of the hub programme. 
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 That the indicators for each scheme should be published by SFT as soon as the two year 
confidentiality period for that scheme has passed. 
 So that up to date information is available publically, but without breaching 
confidentiality on individual schemes, the SFT should publish annual average 
information for each for each indicator as soon as possible after the end of each year. 
 
Looking beyond monitoring, there are also implications for the rationale of the hub programme 
itself. The information analysed in this paper, while limited, nevertheless suggests that the 
financing of hub projects involves a significant opportunity cost to the public sector, (with hub 
projects potentially costing up to 40% more than borrowing equivalent finance from the NLF): 
and also significant potential for the private sector investors in hub sub debt to realise large 
profits, (with sub debt investors potentially able to recover their capital, and make additional 
profits of 80% of the sum invested, on secondary market sales of their holdings). There should 
be active consideration, by the Scottish Government and public authorities, as to whether the 
advantages of the hub approach justify these costs and potential profits. Even if it is too early 
as yet, given the limited information currently available, to make a final decision, these 
questions should be kept under active review, in the light of whatever trends might emerge from 
the improved monitoring system. 
 
7KHUHDUHDOVRLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQWöV3XEOLF$XGLW&RPPLWWHH7KLVFRPPLWWHH
has responsibility for, among other things, scrutinising the financial performance of the Scottish 
Government and public bodies, and for examining the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of 
the public sector. It is painfully obvious, however, (as can be seen, for example, by the 
commiWWHHöV UHVSRQVH WR 6)7öV evidence on 7 December 2017), that the audit committee 
VWUXJJOHVZLWKWKLVUROH7KLVLVZKHUHDFKDQJHRIWDFNLQWKHFRPPLWWHHöVDSSURDFKFRXOGJUHDWO\
help them in discharging their remit. The committee would find it much easier to penetrate below 
the veneer covering SFT activities if they were to insist that SFT reported regularly to the 
committee on the basis of a detailed set of indicators specified by the committee. It is 
recommended that the committee should take this step. And, of course, as regards financial 
indicators, it would be hoped that the indicators outlined in this paper would provide a useful 
starting point. 
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